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Summary 
 
Current state-of-the-art knowledge concludes that green house gas (GHG) emissions must be 
controlled and reduced within the next 30-40 years. The transport sector contributes almost a 
fifth of the current global emissions, and its share is likely to increase in the future. Hence, 
there is a huge demand for low emission solutions for all modes of transport. 
 
This report reviews the current status of second generation biofuels. First generation biofuels 
continue to be substantially subsidized, and this has contributed to the increasing use of such 
fuel. However, recent studies claim that the future of biofuels lies in second generation 
biofuels, in particular biochemical ethanol made from cellulose. Thus, in this report we ask 
the following three questions: How far is second generation biofuels from being a 
competitive GHG abatement technology? Is it likely that first generation biofuels will bridge 
the development of second generation biofuels? And, should trade policy be used to protect 
domestic infant second generation biofuels industry from import of low cost first generation 
biofuels from developing countries?  
 
Ethanol made from cellulose using the biochemical conversion process is far from a ripe 
technology. According to our survey of the literature it seems to have the potential to reduce 
GHG emissions from the transport sector without leading to devastating changes in land use 
practice, which recent critique has held against first generation biofuels. Expert reports point 
to several potential technological breakthroughs which may reduce costs substantially. 
Hence, given that there are market failures connected to private R&D on cellulosic ethanol, 
there may be an opportunity for successful public intervention by providing support to R&D.  
Learning-by-doing also seems crucial for an eventual success of second generation biofuels. 
Thus, again given that there are market failures connected to the initial diffusion phase of the 
technology, government support giving the technology a head start could be warranted.  
 
On the other hand, we doubt that the necessary learning gains can be obtained from 
widespread use of first generation biofuels. Governments should therefore consider scaling 
down the current support to first generation biofuels, in particular, not increasing the blending 
mandate targets. It is hard to design blending mandates such that poor performing first 
generation biofuels are not covered. In order to preserve flexibility when promoting learning-
by-doing, governments should instead look for measures directly targeting investments in 
second generation biofuels facilities. And finally, with targeted support to second generation 
biofuels, there is no need to pay attention to the infant industry argument. Trade policy 
should only aim to correct for insufficient internalizing of GHG emission costs from the 
production of biofuels in countries without a price on carbon. 
 
It is by no means certain that second generation biofuels will play a central role in the 
decarbonizing of the transport market. Necessary cost reductions may not be achieved. The 
GHG emissions from land use change connected to large-scale growing of cellulosic 
feedstock may turn out to offset the gains from changing fuel. Furthermore, other options like 
hydrogen or electric vehicles may experience major innovations making them preferable to 
vehicles running on biofuels. It is important to avoid a technological or political lock-in in 
biofuels. In other words, policies should be flexible, and it should be possible to terminate 
support programs in short notice. 
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1 Introduction 
Approximately 23% of all carbon dioxide-equivalent (CO2e) emissions, or anthropogenic 
GHG emissions, come from the transport sector, which relies on petroleum to supply the 
majority of the energy used in global transport (International Energy Agency – IEA, 2007). 
According to the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), transport’s GHG emissions 
have increased at a faster rate than any other energy-using sector. Emissions are expected to 
continue to grow at a rate of about 2% per year if the current energy usage patterns persist, 
meaning that transport energy use in 2030 will be 80% higher than in 2002. The predicted 
increase is primarily due to continued economic growth in developing countries. Petroleum 
accounts for more than 98% of transport fuel in almost all countries except Brazil (IEA, 
2004), implying that CO2e emissions will essentially grow in lockstep with energy 
consumption. The annual global consumption of gasoline and diesel amounts to a couple of 
trillion liters (US Energy Information Administration – EIA, 2010), implying that even a 
modest replacement with biofuels would turnover several hundred thousand million dollars.  
 
Biofuels have been promoted as one possible and promising way of reducing GHG emissions 
from the transport sector. Moreover, the technology is available today without reducing 
consumer utility of cars as opposed to hydrogen and battery driven cars. Growth of global 
biofuel production is mostly a result of ambitious government support programs. Clearly, the 
support has not only been driven by a concern for GHG emissions, and both the EU and the 
US have invoked arguments about “energy security” and the need for regional development.  
However, in this report we evaluate biofuels policies based on the need to reduce GHG 
emissions. 
 
Biofuels, including ethanol and biodiesel fossil fuel substitutes made from biomass, have 
been in use since the earliest internal combustion engines. In fact, one of the first prototypes 
of the diesel engine was designed to run on vegetable oil, and several of Henry Ford’s early 
cars ran on ethanol. The interest in biofuels was renewed as a result of the 1970s oil shocks 
and is flourishing today with government support motivated by several factors including 
energy security, climate change concerns, and rural development. Moreover, it is common to 
distinguish between so-called first and second generation biofuels. While first generation 
biofuels are made from feedstock also suitable for human food production, second generation 
biofuels are made from cellulosic material not useable as a food source. According to IPCC 
(2007), biofuels have the potential to replace a substantial part of petroleum use in the 
transport sector if technologies using cellulosic biomass succeed. However, according to 
some scholars, even if cellulosic biofuels become commercially successful, they may still 
only replace a few percent of fossil fuels on a global scale. Despite great potential in absolute 
terms, large-scale biomass energy production beyond that level would probably reduce food 
security and exacerbate forcing of climate change (Field et al., 2008). Carriquiry et al. (2010) 
concluded that although second generation biofuels may contribute significantly to global 
energy supply, their economic potential is more limited due to the costs of production relative 
to those of liquid fossil fuels.  
 
The present report discusses policies for the promotion of second generation biofuels as an 
alternative to both fossil fuels and first generation biofuels in the transport sector. In 
particular we ask the following three questions: How far is second generation biofuels from 
being a competitive GHG abatement technology? Is it likely that first generation biofuels will 
bridge the development of second generation biofuels? And, should trade policy be used to 
protect the infant second generation biofuels industry from export of low cost first generation 
biofuels from developing countries?  
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We focus on ethanol made from cellulose and disregard second generation biodiesel. While 
second generation biodiesel according to the literature is a well proven technology with 
excessively high costs, ethanol made from cellulose is far from a ripe technology. 
Furthermore, even if current production costs are too high to make it competitive with first 
generation biofuels, a carefully designed technology policy and a sufficiently stringent 
climate policy could make it competitive in the future.  
 
Current support for biofuels is to a large extent geared towards first generation biofuels. This 
need not be a major problem if first generation biofuels is likely to pave the way for second 
generation biofuels. However, based on our survey we do not find any strong support for the 
pave the way argument. First, the challenging parts of the cellulosic ethanol production 
process are not necessary and hence not present in the production of first generation biofuels. 
Second, the current car fleet can absorb large amounts of cellulosic ethanol without any 
costly adjustments to either cars or filling stations, ensuring that learning by doing can take 
place independent of the success of first generation biofuels.     
 
Even though cellulosic ethanol is considered by many to be a promising technology, there is 
still great uncertainty as to whether production costs will come down and whether the 
availability of raw materials will be adequate for large-scale use of cellulosic ethanol for 
transport purposes. Policies for promoting R&D and learning for cellulosic ethanol should 
only have as their aim to uncover the technology’s true potential, and not operate with 
ambitious goals for the technology’s future market penetration.  
 
Some may argue that import of “cheap” first generation biofuels from Non-Annex 1 countries 
could halt the market introduction of cellulosic ethanol to an undesirable extent. The infant 
industry argument would hold that second generation biofuels should receive protection in 
order to be able to develop. However, given that targeted measures to promote R&D and 
learning-by-doing are put in place, adding another instrument, that as well benefits domestic 
first generation biofuels, seems superfluous. Trade policy should only aim to correct for 
insufficient internalizing of GHG emission costs from the production of biofuels in countries 
without a price on carbon (e.g. Eggert and Greaker, 2009).  
 
It is also well known from the infant industry literature (e.g. Grossman, 1990) that 
governments, by supporting specific industries, run the risk of creating powerful lobbies that 
later hamper the withdrawal of support programs when all learning gains are exhausted. 
Today, we see signs that the support programs for first generation biofuels may have created 
such a “political lock-in,” making it difficult to scale down support even though first 
generation biofuels have proven less promising than originally thought. Hence, governments 
should strive to keep flexibility when crafting support programs for cellulosic ethanol. 
 
Brazil is so far the exception in transport fuel consumption. Dating back to the first oil crisis 
in 1973, the country’s sugarcane program PROALCOOL remains in place, and currently 50% 
of all Brazilian transport fuel comes from first generation biofuels, notably sugarcane ethanol 
(Weidenmier et al., 2008). However, such dramatic substitution of fossil fuels with first 
generation biofuels on a global scale would likely have severe effects on food security and 
habitat conservation. OECD (2006) estimated that replacing 10% of the transport fuel 
consumption in the US, EU and Canada would require in the range of 30-70% of their 
respective current crop area. Another estimate suggests that replacing 85% of the global 
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gasoline consumption with first generation biofuel would use up the entire global harvest of 
sugarcane, maize, wheat, sorghum sugar beet, and cassava (Rajagopal and Zilberman, 2008). 
 
Ligno-cellulosic biomass used for second generation biofuels refers to plant biomass 
composed of cellulose, hemicelluloses, and lignin. Cellulosic materials are abundant, 
estimated to make up roughly 60-90% of terrestrial biomass by weight (Pew Center, 2009). 
Given that land available for the production of feedstock raw materials is ultimately the 
limiting resource for biofuels production, it is meaningful to mention the differences between 
first and second generation biofuels in terms of land-use efficiency.  
 
Land-use efficiency (Larson, 2008) refers to the level of transportation service that can be 
provided from a hectare of land. By taking into consideration the rate of biomass feedstock 
production per hectare, the efficiency of converting the feedstock into a biofuel and the 
efficiency of using the biofuel in a vehicle, one can estimate the vehicle-kilometers of travel 
that can be provided by one hectare of land. Using this measure, second generation biofuels 
can provide an improvement of approximately 50% in land-use efficiency over sugar-based 
first generation biofuels and an improvement of up to 2.5 times over starch-based biofuels. 
This is because they use much more of the above ground biomass than first generation fuels 
(see also Rajagopal and Zilberman, 2008). In addition, cellulosic feedstock may, to a much 
larger extent, be produced on marginal land or even be recovered from organic waste and 
similar residuals, which would reduce the problem of threatening food security and 
destroying habitats when expanding land use. 
 
Despite significant cost improvements over the past several decades, first generation biofuels 
are not price competitive with fossil fuels possibly with the exception of Brazil’s sugarcane-
based ethanol. Even with recent high petroleum prices and no carbon taxation, most US and 
EU producers would not be able to operate without government subsidies (Eggert and 
Greaker, 2009). Furthermore, feedstock commodity price increases and energy costs have 
both contributed to higher production costs of first generation biofuels from 2004 to 2007 
(IEA, 2008). Although there are likely to be incremental improvements in technology, 
significant technology breakthroughs are unlikely, and feedstock costs, which account for 55-
70% of total production costs, are unlikely to fall enough to make first generation biofuels 
fully competitive (IEA, 2008).  
 
Recent contributions have also directly questioned whether first generation biofuels actually 
lead to any short-run CO2 reductions. Obvious sources of emissions include the use of 
fertilizer when growing the first generation biofuel crops and the use of fossil energy in the 
harvesting and processing of first generation biofuels (Greaker and Eggert, 2009). Land use 
change can lead to additional GHG emissions if the area of arable land is increased to 
accommodate growth of crop inputs for the production of biofuels. When land is cleared and 
the soil is disturbed, part of the carbon stored in natural soils and forests is released as CO2. 
Fargione et al. (2008) introduced the concept of carbon debt and hold that it may take up to 
several hundred years to reach break-even after such conversion. A recent report found that if 
the pattern of palm oil production for diesel biofuels continues to develop as estimated, the 
use of palm oil sourced from peatlands in the production of biofuels would be more than 
enough to negate the GHG savings from all EU biofuels (EC JRC, 2008). Other recent 
contributions questioning the GHG reduction benefits of first generation biofuels include 
Searchinger et al. (2008), Khanna et al., (2009) and Lapola et al. (2009).  
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Table 1 GHG reduction including indirect effects 
 
Biofuel type 30 year, 0% discount rate 
Corn ethanol (best case) -26% 
Corn ethanol (worst case) +34% 
Soy-based biodiesel +4% 
Sugarcane ethanol -26% 
Switchgrass ethanol (cellulosic) -124% 
 
Table 1 summarizes the GHG-reducing effect of different biofuels based on lifecycle 
analyses. As can be seen, cellulosic ethanol is by far the most promising biofuel (US EPA, 
2009). Note also that EU biodiesel made from rapeseed scores badly in terms of GHG 
reduction potential (Spitzer and Jungmeier, 2006).  
 
Despite the initial optimism and some success of first generation biofuels, the future lies in 
second generation biofuels (Khanna et al., 2009; Tilman et al., 2009). On the other hand, the 
promotion of second generation biofuels requires a much more targeted policy approach. The 
current use of both blending mandates and trade policy encourages the production of first 
generation biofuels in Annex 1 countries (including the US and the EU Member States). 
Biofuels produced in the US and EU, are among the worst performing, and hence policies 
need to be tailored to support cellulosic ethanol. The US is to some extent starting to follow 
this approach by making funds available for the R&D of second generation biofuels, and in 
2010 the US updated the Energy Independence and Security Act, which included the creation 
of volume requirements for cellulosic biofuels in particular. The EU has not to the same 
extent tailored its support policies to second generation biofuels. 
 
Current hurdles in the ability of second generation biofuels to compete with first generation 
biofuels in meeting mandates and other objectives are primarily related to high costs of 
production due to a combination of unproven conversion technologies and economies of 
scale. The severity of these hurdles varies depending on which of the two main conversion 
pathways are employed to produce the second generation biofuels, i.e., biochemical or 
thermo-chemical biomass-to-liquid. In the next section we survey some of the available 
technologies and report their future prospects.  
2 Status of second generation biofuels 
2.1 The thermo-chemical versus the biochemical pathway 
Two dominant conversion processes are used to produce biofuels from biomass feedstock: 
biochemical and thermo-chemical. A common version of the latter process entails the 
production of a synthesis gas (syngas) by subjecting the ligno-cellulosic biomass feedstocks 
to a severe heat treatment in the presence of a controlled amount of air. The syngas is then 
cleaned before being passed over a catalyst to create a range of liquid fuels – often referred to 
as Fischer-Tropsch liquid fuels after the name of the synthesis. There already exists an 
extensive worldwide commercial application of gasification of fossil fuels such as coal, and 
the experience accumulated from these activities is directly relevant for gasification-based 
conversion of biomass. Furthermore, most of the equipment components needed in a system 
for producing thermo-chemical biodiesel through the catalytic synthesis route outlined above 
are commercially available today. Yet, the production costs for second generation biofuels 
based on the thermo-chemical pathway are currently not competitive with those for first 
generation biodiesel or fossil diesel. Since the thermo-chemical route is largely based on 
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existing technologies that have been around for many decades, there are probably quite 
limited opportunities for significant cost improvements from R&D or learning.   
 
Ligno-cellulosic feedstocks consist of varying levels, depending on the feedstock, of the 
following three components: cellulose, hemicelluloses, and lignin. The objective of the 
biochemical pathway is to isolate and convert the first two components, referred to as 
celluloses, from complex carbohydrates to sugars to ethanol. To date, most of the production 
of ligno-cellulosic ethanol has taken place in laboratories or pilot-size plant settings. Most 
companies have only recently begun to construct and operate commercial-sized 
demonstration plants, with the exception of Iogen, Canada, which has been producing ethanol 
from wheat straw since 2004. Although the technology has been shown to be effective, the 
efficiency of conversion processes still has a ways to go to achieve theoretical maximum 
conversion efficiencies. Thus, compared to the ripe thermo-chemical pathway technology, the 
biochemical pathway to cellulosic biofuels is an infant technology. According to the 
economic theory of innovations, it is in the early stages of product and process development, 
government intervention may be warranted (Grossman, 1990; Olsen et al., 2009). We have 
therefore chosen to concentrate on the biochemical pathway for second generation biofuels in 
the present report.    
2.2 Current cost picture 
 
Production costs for second generation cellulosic ethanol are currently not competitive with 
those for first generation biofuels or gasoline. Advances to date have brought down the cost 
from USD 1.61-2.00/liter gasoline equivalent (lge) in the 1980s to a level where it can 
compete with ethanol from corn today, and future developments can potentially bring down 
costs all the way to USD 0.24/lge (Wyman, 2008). Different assumptions about the timing of 
these factors and feedstock cost predictions explain the variance of future cost estimates 
ranging from USD 0.24-0.60/lge. Even current costs are hard to confirm due to the 
proprietary nature of the data and array of feedstock and conversion technologies available. 
This is evident in the variance in current cost estimates of USD 0.80-1.97/lge in the literature.  
 
Figure 1 Ethanol production cost components by feedstock 
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In Figure 1, we compare the cost split of cellulosic ethanol with that of corn ethanol. 
Chemical costs per unit of production represent a significantly higher proportion of the total 
unit cost of production for cellulosic ethanol than for corn-based ethanol due to the difficulty 
and expense of breaking down the ligno-cellulosic materials to sugars that can be fermented.  
 
Also, capital recovery costs represent a significantly higher proportion of the total unit cost of 
cellulosic vs. corn-based ethanol. The US Energy Information Administration estimates the 
cost of a 13 million liter cellulosic ethanol facility to around USD 375 million, more than five 
times the cost of a corn ethanol plant of similar size (EIA, 2007).  
 
Biomass feedstock used in the production of second generation biofuels is a smaller 
component of overall costs than those used in the production of first generation biofuels, yet 
are still expensive and represent a large portion (~36%) of production costs. Today, the 
market for cellulosic biomass feedstock is poorly developed. Moreover, most crop residues 
have low economic value and, in order to minimize disposal costs, cereal crops have been 
bred and managed to reduce straw and stover yields. These yields can easily be increased if 
there is a value for these agricultural residues, i.e., if they are used as feedstock in the 
production of cellulosic ethanol (IEA, 2008b).  
2.3 Cost reduction opportunities 
 
Although the steps in the biochemical conversion process are similar to those in the 
production of first generation biofuels, the nature of the biomass inputs used in the 
production of ethanol from ligno-cellulosic feedstocks requires different technologies and 
inputs at various stages of the process. The biochemical conversion pathway is presented in 
Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2 Biochemical conversion process 
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(1) Pretreatment – The goal of this stage is to prepare the feedstocks in such a way as to 
improve the separation of cellulose and hemicellulose from lignin and optimize their 
subsequent conversion to sugars as well as maximize the value of co-product 
generation. While the pretreatment stage in the production of first generation biofuels 
is relatively straightforward, pretreatment of ligno-cellulosic feedstocks is generally 
extensive and costly due to the strong chemical bonds of the ligno-cellulose structure. 
Many technologies have been studied, yet none appear to be ideal, although various 
pretreatments have been shown to be better suited to particular feedstocks. This stage 
takes place at the ethanol plant. 
 
The different pretreatment methods include:  
• water-based (e.g., flow through, partial flow through, steam explosion) 
• acidic (e.g., dilute or concentrated acid including H2SO4, controlled pH) 
• alkaline (e.g., ammonia freeze explosion and ammonia recycle percolation) 
and 
• organic pulping (e.g., organosolv using acetic acid or ethanol). 
 
Current pretreatment processes do not meet cost and performance goals. Technologies 
to maximize yields of cellulose and hemicellulose while reducing inhibitors (lignin) to 
the enzymatic hydrolysis process are still being explored. The current technologies 
require significant capital investment and have high operating costs. This stage has 
been identified as requiring learning to improve pretreatment efficiency, which 
impacts the efficiency of the downstream processing steps (IEA, 2008c).  
 
(2) Hydrolysis/saccharification – There are two major hydrolysis processes: a chemical 
reaction using acids and an enzymatic reaction. In the traditional methods developed 
in the 19th and 20th centuries, hydrolysis is performed by attacking the cellulose with 
an acid. A decrystalized cellulosic mixture of acid and sugars reacts in the presence of 
water to complete individual sugar molecules (hydrolysis). The product from this 
hydrolysis is then neutralized and yeast fermentation is used to produce ethanol. The 
BlueFire Ethanol Fuels uses a proprietary process to convert rice and wheat straws, 
wood waste, and other agricultural residues to ethanol using acid hydrolysis. 
 
The majority of the proposed commercial-scale biomass-to-ethanol facilities plan to 
use enzymes rather than acids in order to facilitate fast, efficient, and economic 
bioconversion of celluloses to sugars. In enzymatic hydrolysis, cellulose and 
hemicellulose are exposed to cellulase enzymes that convert the carbohydrates into 
sugars. The enzymatic hydrolysis of starch used in the production of first generation 
biofuels requires a single family of amylases, while the effective hydrolysis of ligno-
cellulosic biomass requires a number of more expensive cellulases to effectively 
break down the interconnected matrix of cellulose, hemicelluloses, and lignin. The 
process can be slow, and represent a significant portion of production costs.  
 
Input  
Enzymes 
Output 
Water 
Cellulose Glucose (6 carbon sugar molecules = hexoses) 
Hemicellulose Xylose  (5 carbon sugar molecules = pentoses) 
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Within this stage, the identification or development of new enzymes that are able to 
degrade ligno-cellulosic substrates may lead to the discovery of cheaper enzymes 
and/or enzymes that hydrolyze ligno-cellulosic materials more efficiently. Enzyme 
producers have already made significant progress in reducing the cost and 
effectiveness of these enzymes. Further reductions in costs within this stage of the 
conversion process will be driven by a combination of new enzymes and by working 
with industry leaders to integrate and optimize the overall conversion process. 
Enzyme recycling, i.e., treating multiple batches of feedstock with the same enzymes, 
may also be used to reduce costs. If the ability to re-circulate enzymes is available, 
enzyme costs will be dramatically reduced.  
      
(3) Fermentation – In this stage, micro-organisms (bacteria and yeast) are used to convert 
the sugars produced in the previous stage into ethanol and various by-products. In the 
production of ethanol from first generation feedstocks, the sucrose or glucose 
products (6-carbon sugars) are metabolized by saccharomoyces or “baker’s yeast,” 
i.e., well-known natural yeast cells. Following the fermentation of the hexoses, the 
ethanol is recovered by distillation. The second generation process produces hexose 
and pentose sugars as a result of the hydrolysis process. Whereas the fermentation of 
hexoses using the natural yeasts already employed in large-scale corn-to-ethanol 
industries is not difficult provided an absence of inhibitors, fermentation of pentose 
sugars is more difficult and new genetically modified yeast strains are being 
developed to effectively use these sugars. Furthermore, there are no known natural 
organisms that can convert both hexose and pentose sugars at high yields. 
 
Cost-effective fermentation relies on the ability of organisms to co-ferment pentose 
and hexose sugars if the feedstock contains a large amount of pentoses. Significant 
progress has been made in engineering micro-organisms for co-fermentation, yet their 
sensitivity to inhibitors and the production of unwanted by-products remain serious 
problems that have to be overcome for the systems to become commercially viable 
(IEA, 2008a). New micro-organisms dictate yield and rate at which products of the 
saccharification stage can be turned into alcohol. Theoretically, a fast pentose-
fermenting micro-organism could increase biomass to ethanol yield by 30-40% 
(Terranol, 2010).  
 
(4) Product separation – In this stage, ethanol is separated from the fermentation broth by 
distillation and dehydration. The residual lignin, unreacted cellulose and 
hemicellulose, ash, enzyme, organisms, and other components end up at the bottom of 
the distillation column. These materials may be concentrated and burned as fuel to 
power the process, or may be converted to various revenue-generating co-products. 
There are no significant differences or difficulties in this final product separation 
phase between first and second generation biofuels. 
 
Consolidation of processes such as simultaneous saccharification and fermentation can 
provide additional processing cost savings. In addition to the production process itself, 
reducing the cost or increasing the yield of the ligno-cellulose feedstock and optimizing the 
collection, development, and commercialization of valuable co-products provide further 
opportunities for cost savings. 
 
We conclude that significant cost reductions for cellulosic ethanol seem to depend on a series 
of small and large innovations in all stages of the production process. Moreover, that these 
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innovations are not likely to be induced from increased production of first generation 
biofuels. A combined effort in R&D and technology learning from commercial-scale 
cellulosic ethanol production facilities is therefore likely needed. For instance, in the 
pretreatment stage, we predict that much progress will come from learning since the basics of 
the pretreatment processes have been identified, while within the enzymatic hydrolysis stage, 
R&D is essential to discover new, more effective enzymes.  In the next section we turn to the 
question of how policy can promote R&D and learning.  
 
3 Policies to promote learning in second generation biofuels 
3.1 Theories of learning and R&D 
Producing cellulosic ethanol requires significant research, demonstration efforts, and 
experience with production in large scale facilities if it is to become a cost-effective gasoline 
substitute and competitive with first generation biofuels. According to IEA (2008b), “strong 
policy signals on the sustainable production and use of biofuels, and efforts to spur the 
competitiveness of second generation technologies, will need to accompany their large-scale 
market penetration…” 
 
Learning curves may be powerful tools when it comes to explaining past and indicating 
future cost gains for relatively new technologies. In its basic form, a learning curve explores 
the relationship between accumulated production at time t and average cost of production at 
time t. It has been shown in numerous studies that a significant, negative trend can be found 
between the cost of a new technology and the accumulated supply of it; take for example the 
gas power electricity generation technology (IEA, 2000). 
  
There are at least two fundamental mechanisms at work behind a learning curve; see IEA 
(2000). First, as personnel engaged in the planning and production of the new product gain 
experience with the new technology, say a second generation biofuels plant, they are likely to 
become more efficient and better organized, both with respect to how to build and how to run 
the plant. Moreover, experience with the product in question makes it possible to explore 
scale advantages in production. This will also show up as a reduction in unit costs. 
 
Second, experience may also induce R&D, which may lead to further improvements in 
technology, i.e., so-called process innovations. Better enzymes would be an example of a 
process innovation that would reduce unit costs. Further, technological progress may also be 
independent of experience with the product under study. For instance, food-related research 
on crop yields could be utilized by the biofuels industry to reduce feedstock costs in biofuels 
production.   
 
From our discussion on the prospects for second generation biofuels, we conclude that both 
R&D and learning seem to be necessary. This can be illustrated by the following learning 
curves.  
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Figure 3 The effect of learning and R&D for second generation biofuels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 3 the letter Q denotes accumulated production of cellulosic ethanol, AC denotes 
average cost of cellulosic ethanol, P0 + t denotes the price on fossil fuel including a carbon 
tax and the Y-axis measures costs and prices in $. The upper curve denoted AC0 illustrates 
the process of learning without R&D. Given the assumed curvature in the figure, learning 
will never be sufficient to make cellulosic ethanol competitive with fossil fuels. However, if 
successful R&D can be carried out, a shift to the lower curve AC1 is possible. Still, R&D 
alone is not enough to achieve competiveness as long as the accumulated output is low. The 
question is then whether the government should intervene not only to support R&D, but also 
to spur second generation biofuels production in order to realize the necessary cost 
reductions. 
 
It is not obvious that the potential for learning requires government intervention. This is 
analyzed in three theoretical contributions by Spence (1981), Fudenberg, and Tirole (1983) 
and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988). All contributions point out that with low discounting of 
future profits and low spillover in learning, that is, firms do not learn easily from each other, 
firms will likely internalize the learning effect. The degree to which learning is shared 
between firms is clearly important for this to happen. High knowledge spillover between 
firms decreases the proprietary value of additional output in any period and consequently 
reduces the incentive to internalize the learning effect. There are many, small players in the 
second generation biofuels industry, which could indicate that future learning gains are not 
internalized when firms make their investment and output decisions. Hence, there could be a 
role for the government to ensure a minimum level of investments in large scale second 
generation biofuels facilities in order to promote learning.  
Q
$
AC0
R&D
AC1
P0+t
13 
3.2  Policy instruments and effect on learning 
In many biofuels-producing and -consuming nations, most policies do not distinguish 
between first and second generation biofuels, meaning that the bulk of the support goes to 
first generation biofuels. One example is the so-called blending mandate, i.e., a regulation 
that requires a certain share of total transport fuel sales to be biofuels. As shown by Eggert 
and Greaker (2009), a blending mandate is nothing more than an implicit subsidy to all 
biofuels, regardless of feedstock and process, and an implicit tax on fossil fuels. As 
important, blending mandates radically change the way different instruments work.  
 
Clearly, all instruments that increase production also increase learning. Moreover, to the 
extent that economic actors believe that the current subsidies to production will be around 
tomorrow, R&D today becomes more profitable. However, the instruments differ if we 
compare i) the amount of extra learning obtained per $ of public spending and ii) the amount 
of additional R&D per $ of public spending. With respect to R&D, governments can probably 
maximize the amount of additional R&D per $ of public spending by subsidizing R&D 
directly. This can be done in a number of ways such as by setting up public R&D 
laboratories, by co-financing private R&D, etc. We will not venture further into the design of 
R&D policy here, yet note that instruments that mainly increase current production volumes 
are probably not efficient instruments for increasing current R&D.   
 
With respect to learning, subsidies should target to the technologies where governments 
expect learning to occur. Eggert and Greaker (2009) provide the following taxonomy of 
instruments:  
 
Table 2 The effect of instruments on learning 
 
 Without blending mandate 
effect on production 
With blending mandate 
effect on production 
 
Domestic 
first gen.  
Domestic 
second 
gen. 
Foreign 
first gen. 
Domestic 
first gen.  
Domestic 
second 
gen. 
Foreign 
first 
gen. 
Tax on GHG emissions 
from conventional fuels 
+ + + + + + 
Blending mandate 0 0 0 ++ + ++ 
Tariff on imports 0 0 - ++ + - 
Insufficient internalizing 
of costs of GHG 
emissions, production 
abroad 
0 0 + - - + 
Insufficient internalizing 
of costs of GHG 
emissions, domestic 
production 
++ + 0 ++ + - 
Strict GHG emission 
product standards 
0 0 0 - + ++ 
Investment subsidy to 
second generation 
biofuels 
0 + 0 0 + 0 
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A GHG tax on conventional fuels will increase the price of conventional fuels and make 
biofuels in general more profitable. Since a GHG tax on conventional fuels is warranted 
regardless of the existence of biofuels, it should be pursued without considering possible 
learning effects.    
 
As mentioned a blending mandate supports all biofuels, implying that the currently least 
expensive ones will benefit most. Hence, a blending mandate is an inefficient way to support 
learning with respect to second generation biofuels. 
 
As long as there is no blending mandate, trade policy will not affect learning in second 
generation biofuels. The reason is that the price of transportation fuels is given as the price of 
conventional fuels. Thus, a tariff only reduces imports of foreign first generation biofuels. A 
blending mandate changes this logic. With a blending mandate, transportation fuel suppliers 
are required to blend in biofuels. If foreign biofuels become more expensive due to the tariff, 
fuel suppliers substitute foreign biofuels with domestic biofuels. However, they will choose 
the cheapest option, which currently is domestic first generation biofuels. Thus, trade policy 
is also an inefficient way to support learning with respect to second generation biofuels. 
 
Non-Annex 1 countries have likely not internalized the cost of GHG emissions from their 
biofuels production. This constitutes a subsidy to the export of biofuels to Annex 1 countries. 
Without a blending mandate in place, there is no effect on the learning in second generation 
biofuels in Annex 1 countries. This changes with a blending mandate for the same reasons as 
explained above. 
 
Finally, Annex 1 countries may also have failed to internalize the cost of GHG emissions 
from their biofuels production fully.  For instance, run-off of fertilizer from fields produces 
nitrous oxide (N2O), which is a very strong GHG. Many Annex 1 countries do not regulate 
run-off properly. From Table 2 we note that insufficient internalizing of costs of GHG 
emissions caused by domestic biofuels production could spur learning.  However, this is a 
costly way of promoting learning as it likely promotes first generation more than second 
generation biofuels, and since first generation biofuels are more GHG intensive it may lead to 
increased GHG emissions thus making it necessary to pay for more expensive GHG 
abatement in other sectors of the economy (given a ceiling on emissions). 
 
A strict GHG emission standard only has an effect if combined with a blending mandate. The 
standard then determines which biofuels are eligible for the blending mandate. Since first 
generation biofuels from the US and EU score badly in terms of GHG-reducing potential, 
they may be shut off from being used to fulfill the blending mandate. This will benefit second 
generation biofuels as long as they score satisfactorily in terms of GHG-reducing potential. 
However, imported biofuels may also score well in terms of GHG-reducing potential, and 
thus the effect on second generation biofuels could be limited. That is, the standard will 
mainly favor foreign first generation biofuels with respect to the blending mandate since 
second generation biofuels are not cost competitive with foreign first generation biofuels. 
However, foreign first generation biofuels should receive no subsidy, which in fact is the 
effect of a blending mandate.  One should also take into consideration that it is difficult to 
calculate GHG emissions for biofuels due to the indirect effects through food markets and the 
emissions from land use change. 
 
If Annex 1 countries decide to stick with the blending mandates, the infant industry argument 
would hold that the competition from foreign first generation biofuels should be limited by 
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trade policy. On the other hand, countries then end up with a very complicated policy mix. 
First, they must introduce and administer a GHG emission standard in order to shut out 
poorly performing first generation biofuels from the implicit subsidy provided by the 
blending mandate. Second, they should put a tariff on foreign biofuels in order to deny well-
performing foreign first generation biofuels the implicit subsidy created by the blending 
mandate. Therefore, it is likely better to support learning in the second generation biofuels 
industry directly by requiring that some share of the blending mandate must be fulfilled by 
cellulosic ethanol. As we can see from the Table 2, investments subsidies could target second 
generation biofuels solely. Then, if used at all, trade policy should only aim to correct for 
insufficient internalizing of the costs of GHG emissions from the production of the imported 
biofuels (Eggert and Greaker, 2009).  
 
Some argue that we need first generation biofuels to “pave the way” for second generation 
biofuels. We have already argued at the end of Chapter 2 that there seems to be no such link 
on the producer side. The technologies and the development challenges are simply too 
different. On the distribution side, gasoline stations need to invest in separate storage 
facilities and pumps in case they are selling high biofuels blends like E85, which consists of 
85% ethanol and 15% gasoline. On the consumer side, all cars can run on blends of up to 5% 
biofuels without any adjustment, while consumers need special “multifuel cars” to be able to 
run on high blends like E85. We question the “pave the way” logic, i.e., that a developed 
market for biofuels will make it easier for second generation biofuels to enter and for learning 
to take place. The user side of the market is able to accommodate up to 5% of the total 
transport fuel volume without any changes in its capital stock.   
4 Current support to ligno-cellulosic ethanol 
4.1  The US 
In 2009, the US produced 10.8 billion gallons, or 40.7 billion liters, of ethanol, a 5.6-fold 
increase over the 2000 level. US support for ethanol production and consumption based on 
both traditional and ligno-cellulosic feedstocks comes in many forms, including tax credits, 
tariffs, standards, and direct funding.  
 
Tax Credits3
• Excise tax credit for ethanol fuel blenders: USD 0.45 per gallon of ethanol 
(including imported ethanol; down from USD 0.51 per gallon once annual 
production or importation of 7.5 billion gallons is reached) 
: 
• Small ethanol producer credit: USD 0.10 per gallon (applies to plants producing 
no more than 60 million gallons per year; credit applies to the entire amount of 
cellulosic, but is limited to 15 million gallons of production for conventional 
ethanol) 
• Cellulosic biofuel producer credit: USD 1.01 (must be produced and used as a fuel 
in the US, net of other ethanol excise tax credits) 
 
Tariffs:  
• There are no tariffs on fibrous cellulosic materials4
                                                          
3 http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode26/usc_sec_26_00000040----000-.html 
 
4 http://www.usitc.gov/publications/docs/tata/hts/bychapter/1000C47.pdf 
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• Ethyl alcohol to be used as a fuel: USD 0.1427 / liter5
 
 (= USD0.54 per gallon) 
plus a 2.5% ad valorem charge, which amounts to approximately a 30% combined 
tariff (note that fossil fuels have close to a zero import duty)  
Some countries are exempt from these tariffs through the Caribbean Basin Initiative and the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The Renewable Fuel Standard 2005 
required 7.5 billion gallons of renewable fuel to be blended into gasoline by 2012, later 
increased to 9 billion gallons in 2008, and then set to increase each year to reach 36 billion 
gallons in 2022, i.e., 7% of the expected annual gas and diesel consumption in 2022 (US 
Environmental Protection Agency – EPA, 2010).  
 
In 2010, the Energy Independence and Security Act created volume requirements by 
renewable fuel type and lifecycle GHG performance threshold standards. While production of 
corn ethanol is set to stabilize at 15 billion gallons per year, cellulosic ethanol has a targeted 
increase from zero in 2010 to more than 15 billion gallons in 2022. Although the mandates 
guarantee a market for second generation biofuels, it is possible for the EPA to delay or 
waive the mandate in a particular year if it is found to cause adverse economic or 
environmental impacts, or if capacity simply cannot be met (USDA, 2010). Furthermore, the 
EPA is required to evaluate and make appropriate market determinations for setting the 
cellulosic biofuels standard each year for the ensuing year. Koplow (2009) estimates the level 
of incremental subsidies provided by the Renewable Fuel Standard above existing tax credits 
and tariffs for ethanol made from corn and cellulosic biofuels to be USD 0.14 and USD 1.25 
per gallon, respectively. This brings the total estimated corn and cellulosic biofuel subsidies 
to USD 0.60 and USD 2.26, respectively, and does not include feedstock input price effects 
of heavily subsidized corn.  
 
The US is providing incentives for producers to produce cellulosic ethanol on a commercial 
scale and, by limiting use of first generation ethanol to 15 billion gallons, is signaling 
confidence in the ability of cellulosic biofuels to contribute significantly as a renewable 
transport fuel despite the lag in build-up of production capacity. In addition, the US has made 
billions of dollars available for technological development and construction of pilot and 
commercial demonstration production facilities. The funding is primarily available through 
the Department of Energy (DOE) and US Department of Agriculture (USDA), yet numerous 
states also offer incentives through the use of grants, tax breaks, and loan guarantees. In 
2006, total cumulative funding through national and state programs applicable to ethanol 
exceeded USD 2.5 billion (OECD/IEA, 2008). From 2007 to 2009 alone, the federal 
government committed a total of more than USD 2 billion to next generation biofuels in 
direct private sector support and to university research and development, including biomass 
projects. In December 2009, the DOE’s Office of Biomass Program awarded USD 564 
million (included in the USD 2.5 billion above) for the construction and operation of pilot, 
demonstration and commercial-scale biorefineries. The USDA also extended two major loan 
guarantees totaling USD 134.5 million in 2009 through the Biorefinery Assistance Program, 
which is authorized to support the construction of up to four demonstration cellulosic ethanol 
facilities and to provide over USD 750 million in grants over a three-year period for the 
commercial production of ethanol from cellulose (USDA Rural Development, 2009).  
 
US policy has generally favored production incentives and mandates and accordingly, 
distribution and refueling infrastructure as well as availability of fuel-compatible vehicles 
                                                          
5 http://www.usitc.gov/publications/docs/tata/hts/bychapter/1000C99.pdf (Heading/Subheading 9901.00.50) 
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continue to be of concern as potential hindrances to the growth in consumption of biofuels. 
Meeting blending mandates will require additional policies such as those targeted to 
infrastructure development and vehicle efficiency. Coyle (2010) concluded that “blending 
and shipping constraints may encourage investors to turn away from cellulosic ethanol in 
favor of processes that yield green fuels (e.g., green diesel, biobutanol) more closely 
substitutable for fossil fuels.” 
 
The US had 2,052 gas stations providing E85 in 2010, mostly in the Midwest due to 
difficulties transporting ethanol. More exactly, ethanol cannot be shipped in existing crude oil 
or petroleum fuel pipelines since it absorbs water and other impurities, affecting fuel quality 
and shortening the lifetime of pipelines. Support is granted for more E85 refueling 
infrastructure and fueling stations receive a tax credit of 50% (up to USD 50,000 per station) 
of the cost of installing pumps prior to 2011 that dispense ethanol blends of at least 85%. 
Only about 8 million flexible-fuel vehicles that can use blends of up to 85% ethanol exist and 
10% blends is the current legal limit for conventional vehicles. Allowing manufacturers to 
receive credit for flexible-fuel vehicles against their Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
(CAFE) obligations was a powerful driver in the production of biofuel-compatible vehicles 
(Galik et al., 2009). However, this policy has been claimed to enable a number of US auto 
manufacturers to avoid penalties that they otherwise would have had to pay on inefficient 
fleets, allowing them to avoid investments in fuel efficiency (IEA, 2010). 
4.2 The EU 
EU ethanol production in 2009 was 4.9 billion liters, up from 2.8 billion liters in 2008 and 
representing an increase of 170% from 2004, with production from wood pulp, whey and 
waste feedstocks, i.e., second generation, increasing, yet only accounting for 1% of the total 
production (ePure, 2010). Imports for fuel use, predominantly from Brazil, totaled 
approximately 0.95 billion liters. The Climate and Energy Package, adopted in December 
2008, contains important legislation for biofuels including a 10% binding target for use of 
renewables in the transport sector by 2020 and the introduction of a comprehensive and 
unparalleled set of sustainability criteria that biofuels need to fulfill in order to be counted 
toward the target. The Renewable Energy Directive highlights the necessity to “ensure the 
commercial availability of second generation biofuels.” Furthermore, when demonstrating 
compliance with targets for the use of energy from renewable sources within the transport 
sector, the contribution made by biofuels produced from wastes, residues, non-food cellulosic 
material, and ligno-cellulosic material will be considered to be twice that made by other 
biofuels; however, the Directive does not set a specific quota for second generation biofuels. 
Among other sustainability criteria, a minimum GHG savings of at least 35% compared to 
fossil fuels from 2013 onwards, rising to 50% and 60% in 2017 and 2018, respectively, is 
required. These standards could work in favor of cellulosic ethanol and other second 
generation biofuels since they have a higher GHG reduction potential than the biofuels 
currently produced, with the exception of sugarcane-based ethanol already imported from 
Brazil by several EU Member States since this fuel already meets these criteria according to 
some lifecycle studies and is much less expensive.  
 
The double counting of non-food cellulosic biofuels in the renewable target and GHG criteria 
are the only policies that indirectly promote the use of lingo-cellulosic ethanol at the EU 
level. In order to implement the current 10% binding target for the biofuel share of transport 
fuel consumption, the European Commission created beneficial conditions for second 
generation biofuels. Hence, the Commission requires that Member States give double 
weighting in their national biofuel obligations to biofuels originating from different feedstock 
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sources, i.e., biofuels produced from wastes, residues, non-food cellulosic material, and 
ligno-cellulosic material (for a critical discussion, see Eickhout et al., 2008). 
 
While the biofuels market in the EU is predominantly a biodiesel market, Sweden has been 
active in the ethanol field for several years with policy measures including promotion of 
high-blend or pure biofuels and low blends compatible with existing distribution 
infrastructure and engines; tax benefits with no limits on quantities  (all ethanol used for fuel 
is tax exempt); and investment in research, technology, and development. Sweden’s supply of 
ethanol is a combination of domestic production and imports from Brazil. The country is 
treating first generation as a bridge to second generation ethanol. Tax exemptions and biofuel 
obligations that require fuel suppliers to include a certain level of biofuels in the fuel have 
been adopted by several EU Member States, and the European Commission encourages and 
believes that the use of obligations, by ensuring large-scale deployment, can bring down the 
cost of promoting biofuels. Excise tax exemptions for biofuels produced or blended in 
European countries have been introduced at various levels up to 100% by most Member 
States. Germany is one of few countries with excise tax privileges provided to second 
generation biofuels. The German Biofuels Quota Act states that “alcohols obtained by 
biotechnological methods for cellulose hydrolysis…are particularly eligible for favorable tax 
treatment” (IEA, 2007). Additionally, Sweden requires all gas stations to sell at least one 
renewable motor fuel and also provides subsidies equal to USD 1,400/vehicle6
 
 for the 
purchase of energy efficient vehicles and vehicles that can use renewable fuels. In 2008, the 
EU had around 170,000 flexible-fuel vehicles in operation, of which 70% were in Sweden, 
and 2,200 E85 pumps. Sweden’s research as it relates to the usage of renewable fuels in the 
transport sector focuses on working closely with the vehicle industry to develop vehicles able 
to use renewable fuels. It is not clear what, if any, portion of this is devoted solely to 
cellulosic ethanol. 
Other large ethanol producers in Europe include Spain and France. Spain’s national and 
regional governments provide subsidies for plant construction, and have exempted alcohol 
used for biofuel from taxation through 2012, amounting to USD 0.57/liter (IEA, 2010). Most 
ethanol is produced from cereals, predominantly wheat and barley. France has utilized 
favorable tax treatment and blending quotas to spur the growth of biofuel production and 
consumption, and this helped the country meet its 2007 goal of having biofuels comprise 
3.5% of the total amount of transport fuels consumed. The French tax preference rate has 
been revised downwards annually. In 2008, the rate was EUR 0.27/liter7
 
 of ethanol and it was 
only available to plants officially approved by the French government through a bidding 
process (USDA, 2008). Following an energy and ecological balance review of biofuels, the 
French Minister of Environment retreated from the 2015 target of 10% biofuels. Since then, 
the government has proposed legislation that supports a biofuels certification system that will 
have economic, social, and environmental impacts, and also encourages research on second 
generation biofuels. One of the main research programs on second generation biofuels, 
Futurol, is exploring the enzymatic hydrolysis conversion process using mainly straw and 
wood biomass.  
The EU has import protection in place in the form of a tariff on denatured ethanol that adds 
around 45-50% to the cost of imported ethanol (FAO, 2008). Other measures that have been 
implemented by some countries to promote biofuels include allocation of resources for 
                                                          
6 USD 1 = 6.60 SEK in Jan, 2011. 
7 USD 1 = EUR 0.73 in January, 2011. 
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expansion of energy crops (Estonia, Slovenia), tax exemptions for corporate fleets and 
flexible-fuel vehicles sales (Ireland), government fleet mandates (UK, Sweden), and 
exemption from congestion charges and access to free parking (Sweden). Direct funding for 
research, infrastructure, and development of biofuels is available in a number of countries, 
although mainly for first generation technologies.  
4.3 Brazil and China 
Brazil is the world’s second largest producer of ethanol fuel behind the US, with 28 billion 
liters produced in 2008. There is currently no commercial production of second generation 
biofuels in Brazil, nor is there an investment policy for first or second generation biofuels 
(some Brazilian states offer tax incentives for first generation mills or special loan conditions 
to support more efficient technologies). However, several companies and organizations have 
initiated second generation R&D efforts and set up dedicated laboratories and pilot plants. 
The IEA notes that the existing refinery infrastructure, in combination with vast amounts of 
bagasse, creates a supportive environment for the development of second generation biofuel 
production. In April of 2010, Brazil temporarily suspended its 20% tariff on imported ethanol 
until December 31, 2011. 
 
Today, Brazil’s biofuel industry is competitive with fossil fuels without government 
subsidies. In response to the 1970s oil crisis, the country invested heavily in the development 
of the ethanol industry, beginning with policies to provide direct funding to create biofuel 
capacity and followed by a group of policies to promote ethanol use, including the setting of 
an ethanol (E100) price 25% less than the gasoline price; a 3% reduction in taxes for vehicles 
powered by ethanol; an ethanol blending quota of 20-25%; import tariffs on foreign ethanol; 
a ban on diesel powered vehicles; mandatory use of alcohol-powered vehicles for all 
governmental institutions; guaranteed remuneration for producers; public loans designated 
for production capacity increase; subsidized loans for farmers; obligations for gas stations to 
sell ethanol; and maintenance of ethanol strategic stocks. The combined policies resulted in 
the adaptation of vehicle engines to E100 fuel. High global sugar prices in the early 1980s led 
to a shift away from E100 vehicles; nevertheless, today all vehicles run on E20 or E25 and 
the sales of flexible-fuel vehicles capable of running on E100 are strong, accounting for 90% 
of vehicles sold. Furthermore, Brazil has a distribution network of more than 37,000 gas 
stations with E25 pumps, of which 35,000 have at least one E100 pump. In 1996, the 
Brazilian government initiated a program to reduce subsidies and by 1999, it stopped 
controlling ethanol prices and eliminated direct industry subsidies. Simultaneously, a new 
law required all gasoline sold in Brazil to contain a 20-25% blend of ethanol.  
 
China’s production of ethanol reached 1.5 billion liters in 2008, supported by funds for 
construction of ethanol plants, preferential tax policies exempting some producers from a 5% 
fuel ethanol consumption tax, and allocation of funds to subsidize losses (IEA/OECD, 2008). 
The target for 2020 is for biofuels to reach 15% of the total amount of fuel sold. In 2006, due 
to concerns about how ethanol production from food crops could affect food supply, the 
government began to restrict production of corn ethanol and announced further subsidies and 
tax breaks for both biofuel producers and farmers who raise feedstocks other than grains. 
Through the Interim Measures of Special Fund Management for Developing Renewable 
Energies, special funds have become allotted to the multi-sectoral development of renewable 
energy, with the transport sector focused on ethanol made from sugarcane and cassava 
(IEA/OECD, 2008). The National Development and Reform Commission acknowledged the 
need to develop biofuel technology using cellulosic biomass, but clear support policies have 
yet to be introduced. In December 2007, the US and China entered into an agreement that 
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covers exchange of scientific, technical, and policy information on biomass production and 
its conversion into biofuels and other products with a particular focus on long-term R&D in 
order to promote further research into and greater use of biomass. Biofuel production in 
China is subject to restrictions on foreign investment, i.e., Chinese investors must hold an 
investment ratio of 51% or more (IEA/OECD, 2008). The country has no specific policies 
targeting second generation biofuels. 
 
Although no policies specific to biofuels exist at the international level, international trade of 
biomass feedstocks and biofuels does exist and has the potential to increase substantially. 
Ambitious blending requirements may necessitate the need for imports. IEA (2010) sees a 
shortage in the US’s domestic supply of first generation and cellulosic biofuels compared to 
Renewable Fuel Standard’s blending requirements for 2012. Furthermore, the US DOE 
projects that 37.9 billion liters of biofuels will be traded globally in the long term. Gurgel et 
al. (2007) hold that low land prices and high biomass productivity per hectare in tropical 
areas in Central and South America and Africa could supply 45-60% of agriculture and 
forestry residue biomass for second generation biofuel production under CO2 stabilization 
scenarios with unrestricted trade of biofuels. Table 3 summarizes the policies in place by the 
countries discussed for both first generation and second generation ethanol fuels. 
 
 
Table 3 Summary of policy measures in place for first and second generation ethanol biofuels 
 
 
RFS Blend. 
requir. 
Tax 
credits 
Tariffs R&D 
support 
Plant 
constr. 
GHG 
standards 
CO2 
permits/ 
tax 
US1 Levels 
inc. 
annually 
 
USD 
0.45/g; 
1.01/g 
USD 
0.54/g+2.
5%: 30% 
total 
Yes Yes Planned 
 
EU2  
10% 
(2020) 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Planned 
 
In some 
countries 
 
Brazil3 
 
20-25% 
 
20% 
    
China 15% 
(2020)  
5% 
 
Yes Yes 
  
 
1. The US is the only country with separate mandates and tax credits for cellulosic biofuels. The Renewable Fuel Standard 
mandates production of biofuels equal to approximately 7% of the estimated 2020 consumption of gasoline and 
diesel. 
2. Level of tax credits/exemptions vary by country. 
3. Tariff has been temporarily suspended. 
 
 
The US and EU have employed different strategies to support the research and development 
of a second generation biofuels industry. The US provides a wide array of producer 
incentives through more substantial tax credits and explicit consumption mandates, although 
the latter is most likely not as effective as it may appear since the criteria can be modified 
annually. Furthermore, the magnitude of funds available for R&D, including for construction 
of facilities, dwarfs that available from the EU and its Member States. The EU only indirectly 
promotes second generation biofuels through the adoption of standards and double-counting 
of non-food cellulosic biofuels. In the US, the majority of funds and policies aim to support 
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technological innovation and production, while in the EU, countries like Sweden tend to 
focus on the infrastructure for widespread use of all biofuels.  
 
A vast majority of all resources devoted to the development of various energy sources and 
systems have so far focused on nuclear energy and fossil fuels (Rajagopal et al., 2009). Still, 
the small percentage used for renewable energy, of which only a share has been used for 
biofuels, amounts to many USD billions. While the motives for developing biofuels have 
always been multipurpose, with the largest emphasis historically on energy security, the most 
commonly cited reason today is the concern of global warming. Since biofuels still comprise 
an almost negligible part of the total consumption of transport fuels, its contribution to 
mitigating the increase in GHG is limited. In fact, many recent influential studies indicate that 
the net contribution from biofuels to GHG emissions may even have been negative so far. 
The most influential critique concerns the indirect land use changes and the fact that 
subsidized biofuels may have spurred deforestation when the search for new land to grow 
biofuels feedstock has led to even tropical rainforest being cut down (Searchinger et al., 
2008; Fargione et al., 2008; see also Holtsmark, 2010). 
 
5 Future biofuels policies 
 
The growth of global biofuels production is mostly a result of ambitious government support 
programs. Clearly, the support has not only been driven by a concern for GHG emissions, and 
both the EU and the US have invoked arguments about “energy security” and the need for 
regional development.  However, in this report we evaluate biofuels policies based on the 
need to reduce GHG emissions. We then discuss three major policy areas with a view to help 
develop the global biofuels supply in a more sustainable way: 
 
i. Given market failures connected to private R&D on cellulosic ethanol, increase the 
available amount of public and private funds for R&D. 
ii. Given learning-by-doing spill-overs among firms making it less probable that private 
actors will invest in learning, provide an exclusive subsidy to cellulosic ethanol equal 
to the learning investment during a limited period of time. 
iii. Ensure correct pricing of fossil fuels. 
 
 
Increase funds for R&D of alternative transport fuels. 
 
The profits from investing in R&D are highly uncertain; no one can say for sure whether the 
outcome will turn out successful. There are several reasons why private investments in R&D 
will be below the social optimum; often there are innovation spillovers and a lack of patent 
regimes that would guarantee all benefits from a successful program to the funder. Hence, 
there is an incentive to try to free ride on others’ progress and, in addition, there are credit 
constraints (Arrow, 1962; Alston and Pardey, 1996; Jaffe et al., 2005). Fluctuations in energy 
prices also create uncertainty for potential investments in production capacity and 
infrastructure necessary for consumption. Such conditions lead to poor incentives for 
irreversible capital investments, ultimately resulting in a loss of production capacity as firms 
go bankrupt. Several contributions (e.g., Hochman et al., 2008; and Rajagopal et al., 2009) 
hold that government interventions with subsidies for production, consumption, and R&D 
have been instrumental in the development of demand and supply of alternative energy. 
These supporting activities have spurred investments, and, together with mandates for 
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renewable fuels that guarantee a market  for renewable fuels, have therefore promoted a 
successful development (Fischer and Newell, 2008; Rajagopal and Zilberman, 2008). The 
presence of spillover effects leads to an underinvestment in R&D compared to what is 
socially optimal, and the existence of network externalities may inhibit widespread adoption 
of the renewable fuels. For instance, empirical studies, according to Popp (2006), suggest that 
imperfections in the markets for innovations imply that the social returns to R&D are about 
four times higher than the private returns (Hoel, 2010). 
 
Mabee (2007) found that the success in the largest biofuel-producing states in the US (over 
half of the domestic production capacity is found in Illinois, Iowa, and South Dakota) is 
closely related to the availability of direct state funding incentives designed to support the 
industry in its start-up phase, while tax exemptions do not seem to influence production 
capacity. Obviously, access to feedstock also played a significant role given that all of these 
states and other major ethanol-producing states lie within or in close proximity to the so-
called Corn Belt. Furthermore, the largest ethanol fuel markets in the US and Europe have 
emerged close to feedstock areas and production facilities since the cost of producing and 
transporting ethanol is the primary limitation to widespread use (IEA, 2004). 
 
Several nations have allocated and begun to distribute funds for the purposes mentioned 
above. Regardless of the reason for a country’s interest in developing a cellulosic ethanol 
industry, R&D funds are necessary to overcome the private sector’s underinvestment due to 
spillover effects. The most difficult issue with respect to this policy is deciding what level of 
funds to make available. The public support for energy research in IEA countries of USD 10 
billion accounted for about 7% of the total R&D investments in 2006, including funds 
allocated to renewable energy sources. These figures are extremely low compared to the 
subsidies for fossil fuels of USD 250 billion in the same year (CICERO, 2010). 
 
Rajagopal et al. (2009) use the term innovation policies for measures to address the issue of 
low investment levels in energy R&D. They focus on both the problem of knowledge 
externalities and the financial market reasons for underinvestment in innovation. Although 
venture-capital firms exist, small and innovative firms may still suffer from a higher cost of 
capital, leading to under-provision of investment in innovations from these firms (Hall, 2002) 
 
Investment subsidies for a limited time period to realize learning potential   
  
One of the criticisms of tax credits and implicit subsidies like blending mandates, in place is 
that, they do not distinguish between technologies at different development stages. Further, 
they are not linked to the development in costs or other market conditions, and they do not 
have sunset clauses. This can result in expensive or inefficient technologies or pathways 
being perpetually favored, creating a situation of “technology lock-in” (Rajagopal and 
Zilberman, 2007). The schemes created to promote learning must be transitional and support 
must be decreasing over time in order to move towards market competitiveness, and to avoid 
adverse lock-in effects and large subsidy burdens (IEA, 2010). 
 
Ideally, in order to promote learning in second generation biofuels production; public policy 
should include a subsidy equal to the learning investment for cellulosic ethanol, defined as 
the difference between the price of conventional fuel and cellulosic ethanol. We are then 
assuming that cellulosic ethanol can in fact become price competitive with fossil fuel-based 
transport fuels as estimates suggest if the right policies are adopted and R&D investments are 
undertaken. This would imply a steadily declining subsidy payment to producers as unit costs 
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decline and sales of the cellulosic ethanol increase. If costs fail to decline with increased 
production as estimated, governments should re-evaluate the subsidy and other fossil-fuel 
based substitutes to determine whether or not to continue their support of the sector. Periodic 
evaluations are necessary in order to mitigate the chance of developing and adopting 
expensive, inefficient technologies. Governments must be able to terminate the subsidy 
scheme if the expected learning effects are not realized. Hence, it is likely better to subsidize 
capital investments upfront than to rely on various forms of price support, including blending 
mandates, that has to be kept in place for several years, maybe decades, in order to spur large 
capital investments. 
 
The US is the only country at this time that has adopted blending mandates for “advanced” 
biofuels, including cellulosic biofuels. Blending mandates for advanced biofuels essentially 
guarantee a market for the cellulosic biofuels regardless of price, which removes the 
distribution network demand risks from producers, encourages production, and most likely 
improves their ability to attain financial backers. By expanding the market for these new 
products, mandates can alter the profitability of R&D activities within the cellulosic biofuels 
field as well. The persistent demand created by the mandate without consideration for costs 
may also reduce the incentive to develop cost-cutting innovations. The ability of the US EPA 
to review and revise targets annually is important in order to prevent widespread adoption of 
cellulosic ethanol in transport fuels in case the technological advancements required to meet 
necessary production cost reductions are not attained and to avoid technology lock-in. 
Blending mandates require additional policies targeted at infrastructure development and 
vehicle efficiency requirements in order to be effective. Furthermore, mandates do not 
discriminate between clean, in terms of GHG emissions, and dirty biofuels and will base 
adoption purely on cost considerations in the absence of fuel standards. Galik et al. (2009) 
noted that the removal of the Renewable Fuel Standard may have a limited impact on ethanol 
production if production tax credits are available. 
 
Tax credits have been introduced by several of the countries with renewable energy goals for 
the transport sector. General tax exemptions for biofuels make these fuels more price-
competitive with petroleum fuels and can be a particularly effective tool in countries where 
the fuel excise tax represents a significant percentage of the price consumers pay for fuels. 
On the other hand, they may adversely affect the fiscal situation in countries that rely on the 
revenue for a large portion of their budget. A tax credit is the equivalent of a subsidy to the 
producer and can lead to the realization of cost reductions from learning effects if the reduced 
marginal costs induce producers to increase production. However, the learning effects will be 
realized more efficiently through the learning subsidy, rendering the tax credits/exemptions 
unnecessary over time. 
 
Although subsidies for a limited period to realize learning effects may be feasible, we again 
stress the need to actually limit the time period. If an industry is provided support, even 
limited success will create an active lobby group. The parties that stand to benefit from 
government support have strong incentives to convince the politicians and desk officers how 
beneficial the existing support is and how necessary it is to postpone any planned phase-out 
of the public subsidies. There is always a risk that the potential gains for society from a 
promoting policy may be partly or even fully offset by wasteful rent seeking if such 
opportunities are available due to, e.g., limitations in the design of the support (Grossman, 
1990). Hence, the use of public support to learning investment may create a situation of 
“political lock-in.”   
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Getting the fossil fuel prices right 
 
Two-thirds of the global oil consumption is used for transportation and a major share of the 
transport fuel is consumed in the US and Canada. More than 40% of the global gasoline 
consumption and about 20% of the diesel consumption takes place in North America. In 
2003, the per capita consumption of oil in the US and Canada was 2.9 gallons per day, while 
the corresponding figure in other industrialized countries was 1.3 gallons per day and the 
global per capita consumption was 0.5 gallons per day as shown in Figure 4 (EIA DOE, 
2010). In the EU, the price for a gallon of gasoline amounts to USD 6-8, while the 
corresponding figure for the US and Canada is USD 2.6 and 3.7, respectively. The high per 
capita consumption in the US is clearly to a large extent a result of a very low gasoline price. 
It is of course possible that the gasoline prices in the EU are too high in relation to the 
external effects caused by fuel consumption, yet if we assume that the current prices in EU do 
approximately reflect the external costs, the global efforts to control GHG emissions would 
benefit tremendously from an adjustment of US prices to the same level as in the EU. Such 
development would also facilitate gasoline price increases in countries like China and Russia, 
which are currently about USD 3 per gallon (HybridSUV, 2010). A similar argument could 
be made concerning subsidies for fossil fuels.  
 
 
Figure 4 Global Consumption of Oil per Capita (EIA, DOE, 2010) 
 
Transport accounts for roughly 21% of GHG emissions in the EU and accounted for 33% of 
CO2 emissions in the US in 2008, an increase of 21.6% over 1990 levels, making it the largest 
end-use CO2 emitting sector with motor gasoline being the primary source.8
                                                          
8 http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/carbon.html 
 Raising fuel 
taxes in the US by the amount suggested may be far from feasible, and an alternative would 
then be to aim for a cap-and-trade system for fuel suppliers. If emission rights are not 
auctioned, but given away for free – the most common procedure is grandfathering, i.e., 
rights are allocated on the basis of historical emissions – the government misses the 
opportunity of getting funding in a less distortive manner than, e.g., through income and 
consumption taxes. However, implementing a cap-and-trade system for a market where there 
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are so many actors, as in the market for end-use of transport fuel, is complicated, and may be 
late in coming. Under conditions of suboptimal fossil fuel taxes and missing cap-and-trade 
systems, a government mandate may be a preferable second-best approach. However, a 
general mandate for biofuels will also drive up the consumption of first generation biofuels, 
implying potential negative side effects, and have a limited effect on GHG emissions as 
described earlier. Revising to an alternative scheme where the mandate only accepts second 
generation biofuels could then be preferred, yet subsidies with mandates lead to adverse 
interaction effects where oil consumption is subsidized instead (de Gorter and Just, 2010). 
 
6 Conclusion - when to call it quits 
Current state-of-the-art knowledge concludes that GHG emissions must be controlled and 
reduced within the next 30-40 years (IPCC, 2007). The transport sector is almost completely 
dependent on fossil fuels and contributes almost a fifth of the current global emissions, and 
its share is likely to increase in the future. Hence, there is a huge demand for low CO2 
solutions for all kind of vehicles. 
 
This report reviews the current status of second generation biofuels; particularly biochemical 
ethanol made from cellulose, and discusses policies that could facilitate competitiveness of 
such fuels. First generation biofuels have been and are still substantially subsidized, and this 
has contributed to the increasing production and use of such fuels. However, recent studies 
claim that the future of biofuels lies in second generation biofuels, and we find little support 
for the previously made argument that first generation will bridge the second generation 
biofuels. Hence, governments should reconsider increasing the existing support to first 
generation biofuels. The support to second generation biofuels should aim at distinguishing 
between first and second generation, and should avoid creating a new “lock-in” of second 
generation biofuels in case they do not fulfill current expectations. 
 
Ethanol made from cellulose using the biochemical conversion process is far from a ripe 
technology, and it has the potential to reduce GHG emissions from the transport sector 
without leading to devastating changes in land use practice, something that recent critique has 
held against first generation biofuels. Hence, there may be a scope for successful public 
intervention by providing substantial support to R&D and to technology learning in order to 
achieve the necessary cost reductions both from innovations and from economies of scale. 
 
This report questions the use of blending mandates to promote second generation biofuels. 
Firstly, the current and planned levels in the US and EU seem to be too ambitious given the 
large uncertainty about the technology’s potential. Secondly, it is hard to design blending 
mandates such that poor performing first generation biofuels are not covered. Thirdly, in 
order to spur investments in second generation biofuels facilities, blending mandates must be 
continued for at least a decade. In order to preserve flexibility, governments should also for 
measures directly targeting investments in second generation biofuels facilities.  
 
With targeted support to second generation biofuels, there is no need to pay attention to the 
infant industry argument, i.e. that competition from well performing foreign first generation 
biofuels should be limited by trade policy. Trade policy should only aim to correct for 
insufficient internalizing of GHG emission costs from the production of these biofuels (see 
Eggert and Greaker, 2009). 
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One important support to biofuels development could be accurate pricing of fossil fuels on a 
global scale, i.e., an unsubsidized price plus an additional cost from an optimal carbon tax or 
a well-functioning tradable emission permit scheme. Today, petroleum products are cheap in 
many countries due to annual subsidies in the range of USD 200-600 billion.  
 
It is by no means certain that second generation biofuels will play a central role in the 
decarbonising of the transport market. Even if a favorable environment for innovations and 
scale economies is created, necessary cost reductions may not achieved. The GHG emissions 
from land use change connected to large-scale growing of cellulosic feedstock may turn out 
to off-set the gains from changing fuel. Finally, other options like hydrogen or electric 
vehicles may experience major innovations making them preferable to vehicles running on 
biofuels. Hence, it is important to avoid a technological lock-in in biofuels and, although the 
fossil fuel lobby is a lot more powerful, we also note that lobby groups for biofuels are 
growing in influence and are likely to advocate continued support to biofuels, creating a 
potential risk of political lock-in. 
 
Interviews 
Erik Trømberg, Research Scientist, Dr. Science, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Department of 
Ecology and Natural Resource Management, July 7, 2010. 
Svein Jarle Horn, Research Scientist, Dr. Science, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Department 
of Chemistry, Biotechnology and Food, July 23, 2010. 
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